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THE NEED FOR A WORLDWIDE DRAFT TO
LEVEL THE PLAYING FIELD AND STRIKE OUT
THE NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION IN
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
I. INTRODUCTION

In June 2009, Bryce Harper was introduced to the baseball world via
a Sports Illustrated cover story that anointed him as "Baseball's Chosen
One."' The article describes the teenager as "a scouting director's perfect
prospect," as Harper "has size, speed, power, intelligence, a lefthanded bat,
an appetite for work, a strong arm, the ability to catch and the athleticism to
play almost any other position." 2 As a result of those desirable
characteristics, the seventeen-year-old catcher from Las Vegas, Nevada is
widely regarded as a surefire top pick in a future Major League Baseball
(MLB) First-Year Player Draft. 3
Under MLB rules, a baseball player is eligible to be drafted and
signed to a major league contract upon graduation from high school, as
long as the player has not attended a college or junior college. 4 College
players are eligible to be drafted if they have completed either their junior
or senior years at a four-year institution, or are twenty-one years of age. 5
In addition, junior college players can be drafted without requiring
completion of a specified number of years. 6
If Harper proceeded through high school in a typical four-year period,
he would be eligible to be selected in the 2011 draft. 7 However, Harper

1. Tom Verducci, Baseball's LeBron, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 8, 2009, at cover (article
at page 62).

2. Id. at 67.
3. Matt Youmans, HarperReady to Give College Try, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, June
14, 2009, http://www.1vrj.com/sports/48018907.htmL.
4. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER, FIRST-YEAR PLAYER DRAFT

OFFICIAL RULES 4 (2009), available at http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp [hereinafter
DRAFT RULES].

5. Id.

6. Id.
7. Id. (stating that a player, like Harper, is eligible to be drafted once he has graduated from
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accelerated his inevitable path towards professional baseball, and after just
two years at Las Vegas High School, Harper earned his GED and enrolled
in the College of Southern Nevada for the 2009-2010 academic year.8 The
baseball prodigy is playing on the junior college's baseball team for the
2010 season, 9 and the consensus belief is that Harper is pursuing this rare
route with the hopes of being drafted as the number one overall pick in the
2010 draft, rather than in the 2011 draft.' 0
There is also discussion that Harper's parents are considering taking
their son to the Dominican Republic in an effort to establish residency
overseas and consequently make him a free agent." Harper's parents have
denied this rumor, 12 and, as seen below, a move to another country would
not garner Harper free agency status in MLB. 13 Nevertheless, it is clearly
evident why Harper-or any superstar prospect in his position-would
have a desire to enter baseball via free agency, as free agency would give
Harper the option to choose which major league team would be his
employer. 14 On the other hand, entry into MLB through the draft does not
allow a player to choose his employer and there is no free market of teams
bidding to acquire his services. 15 This lack of competition results in
high school).
8. See Conor Glassey, Harper Passes GED, BASEBALL AMERICA, Dec. 3, 2009,
http://www.baseballamerica.com/blog/draft/?p= 1916/ (stating that Harper passed his GED, which
he needed to do to be eligible to play baseball for the College of Southern Nevada in 2010); see
also Youmans, supra note 3 (stating that Harper was registered for the GED and planned to
attend the College of Southern Nevada for the following year).
9. Todd Dewey, Harper Shows Flair in CSN Debut, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Jan.
30, 2010, http://www.lvrj.com/sports/harper-shows-flair-in-csn-debut-83143447.html (estimating
that about 100 major league scouts watched Harper's first game at the College of Southern
Nevada on January 29, 2010).
10. Youmans, supra note 3; see also Glassey, supra note 8 ("Playing at CSN should make
Harper eligible for the 2010 draft, where he would be the top talent in the class.").
11. Verducci, supra note 1, at 65.
12. Id. ("'I heard one of the things they're considering is taking him to the Dominican
Republic to make him a free agent,' says one AL executive. 'No,' Sheri says. 'We are not taking
our son out of the country."').
13. See DRAFr RULES, supra note 4, at 4; see also Glassey, supra note 8 (stating that Harper
is attending a junior college in Nevada).
14. See 2007-2011 Basic Agreement Between the Major League Clubs and the Major
(effective
Dec.
20,
2006),
League
Baseball
Players
Association,70-71
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba-english.pdf [hereinafter ]("Players who otherwise become
free agents under this Agreement shall be eligible to negotiate and contract with any Club without
any restrictions or qualifications...."); see also Tyler Kepner, FreeAgency Means Free Choice,
NYTIMES.COM BATS BLOG, Nov. 21, 2009, http://bats.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/2 1/freeagency-means-free-choice/ (explaining that "'Free agency means free choice"' is one of the
fallback expressions of Brian Cashman, the general manager of the New York Yankees).
15. See DRAFT RULES, supra note 4, at 4 ("A Club generally retains the rights to sign a
selected player until... August 15th, or until the player enters, or returns to, a four-year college
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limited earning potential for a draftee, especially when compared to the
escalating rookie contracts signed by foreign-born free agents. 16
Under current MLB rules, if a player is a resident of the United
States, Canada, Puerto Rico or other territory of the U.S., he can sign with a
major league team only after being selected by the team in the annual entry
draft-or sign with any team after not being selected in a draft in which the
player is eligible. 17 "Also considered residents are players who enroll in a
high school or college in the United States, regardless of where they are
from originally." 18 However, all international players who are residents of
countries other than those listed above are not eligible for the draft and are
free to sign with any team when they reach the age of seventeen years old
(sixteen if the player will turn seventeen by the end of the baseball
season). 19
As a result of Harper's enrollment in a high school and a junior
college in the U.S., he would be considered a U.S. resident for draft
purposes.20 Therefore, the creative option of switching his country of
residence from the U.S. to another nation to become ineligible for the draft
is no longer a viable option.21 Harper might have been able to pursue this
unique path if he and his family had moved to a foreign country and
established residency prior to enrolling in school in the U.S., but that
or junior college on a full-time basis.").
16. See, e.g., Chico Harlan, Strasburg, The Japan Possibility, and A Comparison, WASH.
POST,
July
3,
2009,

http://voices.washingtonpost.com/nationaisjournaU/2009/07/strasburg-the-japan-possibilit.htm(comparing the salary potential for 2009 number one overall pick, Stephen Strasburg, to rookie
contracts signed by foreign-born free agents); David Waldstein, Nationals Sign Top Draft Pick,
but
Need
$15
Million
to
Do
So,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
17,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/sportsibaseballl18draft.html?_r=l/
(stating that Stephen
Strasburg signed a rookie contract with the Washington Nationals worth $15.1 million over four
years, the largest contract ever given to a drafted baseball player); Erik Manning, Are FirstRound
Draft
Picks
Overpaid?,
FANGRAPHS.COM,
Aug.
21,
2009,
http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/index.php/are-first-round-draft-picks-overpaid/ ("Even with the
relatively high failure rate, first round draft picks are incredibly valuable and actually have proven
to be quite a bargain.").
17. See DRAFT RULES, supra note 4, at 4 ("A player who is eligible to be selected and is
passed over by every Club becomes a free agent and may sign with any Club until the player

enters, or returns to, a four-year college full-time or enters, or returns to, ajunior college.").
18. Id.
19. Melissa Segura, In InternationalMarket, MLB Teams are Buying Costly Lottery Tickets,
SICOM,

July

2,

2009,

http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/melissa-segura/07/02/international.signing/index.ht
ml.
20. See DRAFT RULES, supra note 4, at 4 (stating that an amateur player who enrolls in a
U.S. high school or college is considered a U.S. resident for MLB draft purposes).
21. See id.
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window is now closed for Harper.2 2
Moreover, MLB publishes an annual handbook clarifying the league's
definition of residency for official use by team executives and scouting
directors.23 MLB considers the following factors when determining
residency for draft purposes: "length of stay at the current address, where
the player intends to live long-term, where he has lived previously, where
he obtained his passport and his 2place
of birth . ,,
24 "These factors are
5
intended to weed out ...shams."
A recent example of the successful exploitation of the residency
loophole was exhibited in the case of Aroldis Chapman, a twenty-one-year-26
old Cuban defector who migrated to Europe instead of coming to the U.S.
In August 2009, Chapman, a prized pitching prospect, defected from the
Cuban national team during a tournament in the Netherlands. 27 He moved
to Spain and, one month later, his representatives announced that Chapman
had established residency in Andorra, a tiny country next to Spain.28
Chapman pursued this path solely to avoid being eligible to be selected in
MLB's amateur draft, 29 because under MLB Rule 3 governing contracts, a
player is considered a U.S. resident if he "establishes a legal residence in
the U.S. on the date of the player's contract or within one year prior to that
date." 3 ° MLB granted Chapman his very valuable free agent status less
than one week after he established residency in Andorra.31
In contrast to Chapman's situation, the non-U.S. residency loophole is
not currently available to Harper, because he would be considered a U.S.
resident for MLB draft purposes.32 Furthermore, Harper has no standing to
sue MLB under federal antitrust laws, because MLB's "[a]ntitrust
22. See id.
23. Dave Sheinin, Boras May Explore Japanfor Strasburg, WASH. POST, July 3, 2009, at
Dl.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Jorge Arangure Jr., Cuban Defector Chapman FiresAgent, ESPN.CoM, Nov. 21, 2009,
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=4677068; see also Scott M. Cwiertney, Comment,
Need for a Worldwide Draft: Major League Baseball and Its Relationship with the Cuban
Embargo and United States Foreign Policy, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 391, 403 (2000) ("Major
League agents who represent players want Cuban players to reside in a country other than Cuba
or the U.S. so teams can sign the players as free agents when they move to the U.S.").
27. Arangure Jr., supra note 26.
28. Jorge Arangure Jr., PitcherChapman Awaits MLB "sRuling, ESPN.coM, Sept. 21, 2009,
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=4491904.
29. Id.
30. Sheinin, supra note 23, at DI.
31. Arangure Jr., supra note 26.
32. See DRAFT RULES, supra note 4, at 4.
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exemption leaves MLB free from federal oversight with respect to potential
draftees."' 33 Accordingly, as analyzed below, Harper's only realistic
recourse would be to bring an employment discrimination lawsuit against
MLB. 3 4
The major hurdle that Harper would encounter when mounting a legal
challenge to the draft would be overcoming the collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) that governs MLB. 35 In the 1960s, the Major League
Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) became a "bona fide labor
union." 36 According to the MLBPA web site, "the successful founding of
the MLBPA changed the landscape of professional sports forever, serving
notice that highly skilled athletes would seek the same basic employment
37
rights that people in other professions had long taken for granted.
Beginning in 1968, when the MLBPA and MLB owners negotiated the
first-ever CBA in professional sports, the rules and regulations of the sport
as they pertain to labor have been established in the form of successive
collective bargaining agreements. 38
At the beginning of the CBA it is stipulated that the MLBPA
"represents that it contracts for and on behalf of the Major League Baseball
Players and individuals who may become Major League Baseball Players
during the term of this Agreement.", 39 Furthermore, "[b]y virtue of the
CBA, most aspects of the relationship between teams and players fall under
the auspices of national labor law.",40 While almost all of the players
selected in the draft do not immediately enter onto the forty-man rosters of
MLB teams, 4' and therefore are not members of the MLBPA, 42 "the
33. Rick J. Lopez, Comment, Signing Bonus Skimming and a Premature Callfor a Global
Draft in Major League Baseball, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 349, 355-56 (2009).
In 1922, MLB was ruled to be exempt from antitrust laws. Recent legislation, the
Curt Flood Act of 1998, limited MLB's antitrust exemption to provide major league
players with the same protection as athletes in other major professional sports....
The statutory protection gives major league players the right to sue for any
"conduct, acts, practices, or agreements" that have injured their chance to sign a
subsequent MLB contract. Minor league baseball players, including every new
draftee, are explicitly denied standing to sue under the statute.

Id.
34. See infra Part IV.A.
35. See infra Part IV.B.
Association,
Players
League
Baseball
Major
of
the
36. History
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/history.jsp (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 2007-2011 CBA, supra note 14, at 1.
40. Timothy Davis, Tort Liability of Coaches for Injuries to Professional Athletes:
Overcoming Policy and Doctrinal Barriers, 76 UMKC L. REV. 571, 590 (2008).
and
Statistics,
Regulations
Rules,
Miscellany:
41. MLB
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MLBPA has a voice in draft issues because the current collective
bargaining agreement stipulates a system by which draft picks are used to
compensate teams for the loss of players who sign with other clubs via free
agency." 43 This tangential connection to the draft enables MLBPA to have
some control over the draft, 44 but the union does not wield nearly as much
power as it does over key labor issues wholly involving major leaguers,
such as free agency and arbitration. 45
Although this lack of power over the draft is evidenced by the fact
that the rules regulating the draft are not established within the CBA,4 6
drastic changes to the draft system were conditionally accepted by both
sides in an attachment to the 2003-2006 CBA.47 The addendum illustrated
the desire of both parties to implement a global draft in the near future.4 8
However, in the subsequent-and current--CBA that expires in December
2011, a worldwide draft is not mentioned, 49and there is no indication of any
intention to alter the draft-eligibility rules.
As exhibited in the analysis below, Harper's chances of successfully
challenging the MLB draft would likely depend on the strength of his
argument that MLB's drafting system violates a federal or state
employment discrimination law.50 In addition, he would need to establish
that the employment discrimination law prohibiting the drafting process is
not preempted by national labor law that oversees the CBA and generally
encourages owners and unions to collectively bargain all terms and

http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/official-info/aboutmlb/rules.regulations.jsp (last visited Feb. 6, 2010)
("A Club's 40-man roster is a list of all the players currently reserved by a Club at the Major
League level. The Major League Rules permit each Club to reserve a maximum of 40 players
(excluding players on the 60-day disabled list) at any one time.").
42. Major League Baseball Players Association:
Frequently Asked Questions,
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/faq.jsp (last visited Feb. 6, 2010) ("All players, managers,
coaches and trainers who hold a signed contract with a Major League club are eligible for
membership in the Association[,]... [which] represents around 1,200 players, or the number of
players on each club's 40-man roster, inaddition to any players on the disabled list.").
43. Lopez, supra note 33, at 356-57.
44. Id. at 355-56.
45. History of the Major League Baseball Players Association, supra note 36.
46. See generally 2007-2011 CBA, supra note 14.
47. See generally 2003-2006 Basic Agreement Between the Major League Clubs and the
Major League Baseball Players Association, Attachment 24, 202-04 (effective Sept. 30, 2002),
http://www2.bc.edu/-yen/Sports/mlbpa-cba.pdf [hereinafter 2003-2006 CBA].
48. Id. (stating that the Office of the Commissioner of Baseball and the MLBPA "agreed
that the First-Year Player Draft should be expanded to cover all players... regardless of a
player's residence").
49. See generally 2007-2011 CBA, supra note 14.
50. See infra Part IV.A.
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conditions of employment. 5'
Part II of this Comment will focus on the history of the MLB draftas well as drafts in other professional sports-and will define the elements
of national origin discrimination. Part III dissects the legal history of
federal and state employment discrimination laws, as well as details the
purposes and preemption power of national labor law. These laws are
applied to Harper's case in Part IV. Part V concludes by explaining how a
successful challenge by Harper could inspire MLB to do something that it
should have done long ago: institute a global draft where all players from
all countries are treated equally and are eligible to be drafted.

II.BACKGROUND
A. The History of the MLB Draft
The MLB Amateur Draft was first conducted in 1965, and in 1998
was renamed the First-Year Player Draft. 52 The draft was devised to give
weaker organizations the first crack at top talent, and as a result, teams
select players essentially in reverse order of their previous season's
finish. 53 The drafting system has undergone several modifications since
1965, including changes in eligibility requirements and the number of
drafts per year,5 4 but with the exception of a separate and short-lived draft
experiment in 1985, the draft pool has only consisted of prospects from the
United States, Canada, and U.S. territories. 55 "In spring 1985, after Major
League Baseball experimented with a draft of Dominican Republic
amateurs, the record-keeping of eligible prospects was so haphazard that
several players were selected by more than one team.", 56 Although the
addition of players from the Dominican Republic to the draft pool led to
"administrative chaos," a permanent worldwide draft and closer scrutiny of
visa information following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks 57 could
possibly help quell the confusion that doomed the 1985 draft.
51. See infra Part IV.B.
52. Gary Rausch, Evolution of the Draft: Selection Process Has Seen Many Phases Since
1965,
MLB.COM,
May
16,
2002,
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20020516&contentid=26646&vkey=newsmlAb&fext
=.jsp&c_id=null/.
53. Id.

54. Id.
55. See Alan Schwarz, Pressure Building for Draft of Players from Outside US., N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 2008, at SP4; see also DRAFr RULES, supra note 4, at 4.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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Four years after the failed Dominican experiment, MLB permanently
expanded the draft to include players from Puerto Rico and other U.S.
territories.5 8 Players from those territories could previously sign as free
agents when they reached the age of seventeen, but beginning in 1989 they
became eligible for the draft after their high school class graduated. 5 9 "In
1991 Canadian players were taken off the open market and added to the
draft., 60 Two years later, all Cuban defectors who had migrated to the U.S.
were added to the growing draft-eligibility pool. 61
The addition of Puerto Rican amateurs to the MLB draft has had a
devastating impact on the game of baseball on the island.6 2 Puerto Ricans
have to compete for draft spots with North American players, "many of
whom benefit from organized high school baseball programs as well as
summer club programs." 63 On the other hand, "Puerto Rico's public
school system does not offer baseball on a state level. High school students
get noticed in Puerto Rico because big league scouts watch American
Legion, Connie Mack, Little League and Puerto Rico's Superior League
junior program." 64 By contrast to the superior organization of amateur
Rico's system makes it tough for
baseball in the U.S. and Canada, "Puerto
65
the scouts to even find the talent."
As exhibited in a 2003 study by Emory University School of Law
professors Joanna M. Shepherd and George B. Shepherd, statistics reflect
the damaging consequences to Puerto Rican baseball after MLB added the
island's players to the draft in 1989.66 The Shepherds observed:
Teams quickly cut back their scouting and development efforts
in Puerto Rico. One sports reporter noted that because of the
draft, "As scouts lament, there is no incentive to beat the bushes
for players with long-term potential in Puerto Rico as was the
case with Sammy Sosa in the Dominican Republic." Another

58. See Rausch, supra note 52.

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Joanna M. Shepherd & George B. Shepherd, U.S. Labor Market Regulation and the
Export of Employment: Major League Baseball Replaces U.S. Players with Foreigners 20
(Emory Law & Econ. Research, Research Paper Series No. 7, 2003), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-370422.
63. Gabrielle Paese, Baseball School Aims to Place More Puerto Rican Players in Major
Rico
HERALD,
Dec.
13,
2002,
http://www.puertoricoLeagues,
PUERTO
herald.org/issues/2002/vo16n50/PRSportsBeatO650-en.html.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 62, at 20.
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suggested, "Major league teams have bypassed Puerto Ricans in
favor of younger players from the Dominican Republic and
Venezuela who can be developed earlier on."
In less than a decade after 1989, the number of Puerto Rican
players signed per year had dropped more than [forty percent]. 67
The findings in the Shepherds' draft study are echoed by a recent
proposal made by the Puerto Rican government to MLB.68 In September
2007, David Bernier, Puerto Rico's Secretary of Sports and Recreation, met
with MLB officials and outlined a proposal that he thought would propel
the revival of baseball on the island.69 Bemier's plan focused on "a 10year moratorium to the application of the First-Year Player Draft for Puerto
Rican baseball players. 7 ° Bernier expressed these beliefs to MLB
officials:
"The sudden establishment of the Draft, without previous notice
nor trial period, did not allow Puerto Ricans to transform their
development model to make it compatible with the new
statutory reality. . .
"The investment in Puerto Rico is not a cost-effective one for
Major League teams and has lost charm for the recruiter. This
reality is substantiated by the decrease in numbers of [Puerto
Rican] players selected through the Draft and active in the Major
Leagues."
"Why invest in Puerto Rico if 70 miles west and 500 miles
south, in Dominican Republic and Venezuela respectively, I can
invest directly in the detection and development without going
through the Draft process ...
"This creates a domino effect [in Puerto Rico], less players at
the top, less enthusiasm at the base." 7'

67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Jesse Sanchez, Puerto Rico Wants Out of the Draft: Island's Sport Secretary
Proposes
JO-Year
Hiatus,
MLB.cOM,
Sept.
12,
2007,
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20070912&content-id=2204904&vkey-newsmlb&fe
xt-.jsp&c_id=mlb/.

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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Bemier's "less enthusiasm at the base' 72 observation was in reference to
the announcement, made in the previous month, that the Puerto Rico
Winter League would be suspending league play after sixty-nine years.
The league shut down because of financial reasons, and Bernier suggested
that the demise of the winter league was related to Puerto Rico's inclusion
in the MLB drafting process. 74 Today, Puerto Rico's new professional
winter league, the Puerto Rico Baseball League, has completed two seasons
of play; 75 Bernier is now president of the Puerto Rico Olympic
Committee; 76 and two years after Bernier made his ten-year draft hiatus
proposal, Puerto Rican players can still only enter professional baseball via
the draft,7 7 and there is no indication that change is on the MLB horizon.
B. The Globalizationof Major League Baseball
While Puerto Rican baseball has suffered in the past two decades,
baseball in other Latin American countries is flourishing.
For example,
in 2007, "players from the Dominican Republic and Venezuela alone
comprised a peak of [eighteen] percent of opening day rosters." 79 That
same season, twenty-nine percent of maj or league players hailed from Latin
American nations (Cuba, Mexico, Puerto Rico, Venezuela and the
Dominican Republic), more than double the thirteen percent rate in 1990.8o
This trend has coincided with the fact that, "[a]ccording to MLB, the
amount major league clubs spend each year on signing international players
has more than tripled in the last five years, to nearly
$71 million. And
8
more than half has been spent in the Dominican." 1
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Sanchez, supra note 68.
75. See Baseball-Reference.com, Puerto Rico Baseball League, http://www.baseballreference.com/bullpen/Ligade._BisbolProfesional de PuertoRico (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
76. Press Release, City of New York, Mayor Bloomberg Hosts Reception in Celebration of
the
National
Puerto
Rican
Day
Parade
(June
11,
2009),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/htmli/2009a/pr265-09.html.
77. DRAFT RULES, supra note 4, at 4.
78. See, e.g., Schwarz, supra note 55.

79. Id.
80. Richard Lapchick, The 2008 Racial and Gender Report Card: Major League Baseball
app.
1
at
16
(Apr.
15,
2008),
available
at
http://www.tidesport.org/RGRC/2008/2008_MLB_RGRCPR.pdf;
see
also
BaseballAlmanac.com, Major League Baseball Players by Birthplace, http://www.baseballalmanac.com/playersfbirthplace.php (last visited Feb. 6, 2010) (chronicling the birthplace of all
major league players every year since 1876).
81. Kevin Baxter, The Shortcuts: Deeply Entwined MLB Investigates Steroid Use,
Document Fraud and Skimming as Dominican ProspectsSeek Rich US. Contracts, L.A. TIMES,
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Baseball teams are also spending a greater percentage of their
scouting and development budgets on running baseball academies in Latin
American countries. 82 In the Dominican Republic, all thirty major league
teams currently operate elaborate training academies, with an estimated
$100 million per year pouring into the economy.8 3 Until November 2009,
the Milwaukee Brewers were the only team that did not have a Dominican
baseball academy. 84 The team's executives closed the academy in 2003
after they "noticed that many of their best Latin American prospects arrived
to play in the United States almost as undeveloped as when they first joined
the organization." 85 Six years later, the Brewers admitted their mistake and
re-opened a training academy in the Dominican Republic. 86 As Gord Ash,
"What we thought
Milwaukee's assistant general manager, explained:
87
might be a competitive advantage, wasn't."
In retrospect, this spending trend-Latin American countries
receiving money that in the past presumably would have been spent on
developing and paying American players-began when the MLB draft was
instituted in 1965.88 "After a few years of experience with the draft, teams
recognized that scouting/development resources were no longer well-spent
in the United States. Beginning in the 1970s, teams increasingly moved
their scouts from the U.S. to Latin America.", 89 In their draft study, the
Shepherds analyzed the percentage difference of U.S. and foreign players
in the major leagues since the advent of the draft. 90 The authors concluded
that the draft "has led to large growth in the number of foreign MLB
Sept. 22, 2009, at C5.
82. See id.
83. See id. (stating that in September 2009, twenty-nine of thirty teams had training
academies in the Dominican Republic); see also Adam McCalvy, Inbox: Can Brewers Ink
2009,
30,
Nov.
MLB.COM,
Term?,
Long
Fielder
http://milwaukee.brewers.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20091128&contentid=7724664&vkey
-news_mil&fext=.jsp&c_id=mil/ [hereinafter McCalvy, Can Brewers] (stating that the Brewers
opened up a training academy in the Dominican Republic in November 2009).
84. McCalvy, Can Brewers, supra note 83 ("[O]n Nov. 1, the Brewers opened their own
training facility north of the Dominican capital of Santo Domingo, the first time since 2003 that
Milwaukee has a standalone presence in Latin America.").
85. Jorge Arangure Jr., The Brewers' Stunning Move, ESPN.COM, Mar. 10, 2009,
http://insider.espn.go.com/mlb/insider/news/storyid=3974539.
86. See McCalvy, Can Brewers,supra note 83; see also Adam McCalvy, Brewers May Re2009,
Jan.
12,
MLB.COM,
Camp,
Dominican
Open
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20090112&content-id=3740907&vkey=news_mlb&fe
xt=.jsp&c id=mlb&partnerldTss_mlb/ [hereinafter McCalvy, Dominican Camp].
87. McCalvy, Dominican Camp, supra note 86.
88. See Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 62, at 10-11.
89. Id.
90. See generally id. at 1-2.
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players and a similar decrease in the number of U.S. players." 9
Furthermore, the Shepherds stated that "a worldwide draft would slow the
increase in the numbers of foreign players; no longer would foreign players
92
enjoy the advantage that the draft now creates."
Since the 1980s, baseball has discussed conducting a worldwide
draft. 93 In addition to equalizing the entry rules for U.S. and international
players, a global draft would address the significant competitive issue of
large-market teams outbidding others for top foreign talent. 94 "[MLB and
the MLBPA] actually agreed to the concept of a worldwide draft during the
labor deal of August 2002." 95 Attachment 24 to the 2003-2006 CBA is a
memorandum that was signed by officials from both parties. 96 The
addendum states that both sides "agreed that the First-Year Player Draft
should be expanded to cover all players who are first entering Major
' 97
League or Minor League baseball, regardless of a player's residence."
The memorandum further explains that "[i]n the course of those
discussions, however, it became apparent that there was insufficient time
for the type of deliberation and negotiation necessary to reach agreement
on the many issues posed by such a significant change in the First-Year
Player Draft." 98 As a result, both sides agreed that "[n]o later than October
15, 2002" a worldwide draft subcommittee comprised of an equal number
of representatives from MLB and the MLBPA would begin deliberations to
"consider all issues relating to the acquisition of players through a
worldwide draft system." 99
MLB officials believed that a worldwide draft would be implemented
by 2004 at the latest, but the subcommittee scarcely met and the issue was
hardly discussed during the 2006 labor negotiations. 100 However, there has
been recent MLB support for an expanded draft. '0'In July 2008, MLB
Commissioner Bud Selig stated that management had an increased interest
in a worldwide draft. 102 "But, Rob Manfred, his executive vice president
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 29.
Id.
Schwarz, supra note 55.
Id.
Id.
2003-2006 CBA, supra note 47, at 202.
Id.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Schwarz, supra note 55.
101. Ronald Blum, MLB Likely to Defer Worldwide Draft to 2012, USA TODAY, July 15,
2008, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2008-07-15-2471318374_x.htm.
102. Id.
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for labor relations, indicated owners probably wouldn't push for the
[MLBPA] to reopen the [CBA] over the issue." 103 Manfred said that
although baseball is "not near making any decision" on a worldwide draft,
he thought that "the most likely course of events is that it would be handled
in the next round of bargaining" in 2011. 104 Manfred and Selig represent
the interests of MLB and the team owners, and "[t]he owners would like to
control spending on amateur players by subjecting international players to
the draft." 105

In a rare meeting of the minds, the MLBPA agrees with MLB
concerning the need to expand the draft globally. 106 In a radio interview on
WFAN in New York in December 2009, Michael Weiner, the executive
director of the MLBPA, explained why the players were in favor of a
global draft in 2002, and why they were supportive of instituting a
worldwide draft today:
The owners proposed [an international draft] to the players in
2002 and [the players] immediately said, "Fine." The players
stand very firm when there is a principle to stand upon, and
nobody stands on the principle that a kid from Texas should be
treated differently than a kid from Venezuela or from the
[Dominican Republic] as they enter professional baseball. So,
the concept of an international draft or common rules for all
players entering the game makes a lot of sense to us. The devil
could be in the details, that is what happened in 2002. 107
Although complex details need to be resolved before a worldwide draft is
finally implemented, the shared belief of both negotiating sides should
hopefully propel the creation of a global draft. Moreover, competitive
issues 108 and suspected legal wrongdoings involving foreign-born
prospects 109 further exemplify why an expanded draft is a much-needed
priority for the sport of baseball.

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Bill Shaikin, Baseball PlayersSuggest Changes, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2009, at C3.
106. See, e.g., Podcast: Interview by Mike Francesa with Michael Weiner, Executive
Director, MLBPA, on WFAN Radio (Dec. 2, 2009), http://podcast.wfan.com/wfan/2089981.mp3
(expressing the players' support of a global draft 8:00 into recording).
107. Id.
108. Schwarz, supra note 55 (discussing the trend of more teams entering into bidding wars
and consequently driving up prices of foreign-born free agents).
109. Id. (detailing a recent rash of foreign players who have been caught lying about their
ages, and discussing a 2008 "F.B.I. investigation into whether scouts and major league executives
pocket[ed] money that was earmarked for Latin prospects").
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C. Worldwide Drafts in OtherProfessionalSports
While MLB has struggled with the unequal and unfair consequences
of its regionalized draft, the National Basketball Association (NBA) "l and
National Hockey League (NHL) ...
have conducted global drafts for many
years. In the NBA, the first international player was selected in the 1970
draft, 112 and the last decade has witnessed a dramatic influx of foreign-born
draftees. 113 In 2003, eight foreign players were taken in the first round. 114
In addition, the 2004 and 2006 first rounds each featured six international
prospects being selected. 115 Today, NBA teams employ full-time scouts
stationed overseas, and "[t]he shrinking of the game globally has made it
easier for players to be scouted and for possible flaws to be exposed
earlier." 116
The San Antonio Spurs epitomize the internationalization of the
NBA. The Spurs have won four titles since 1999, and two key players
during their title run are foreign (Argentina's Manu Gin6bili and France's
Tony Parker). 117 Neither player played college basketball in the U.S., but
the Spurs selected both stars in the global NBA draft (Ginobili in the
second round in 1999, Parker in the first round in 2001). 118 In addition,
Tim Duncan, San Antonio's superstar power forward, grew up in the U.S.
Virgin Islands (although he attended Wake Forest University). 119
In contrast to the unequal entry rules currently instituted in MLB, the
same draft-eligibility requirements apply to all prospects in the NBA. 120
110. See,
e.g.,
NBA.com
Lifting
the
Torch,
http://www.nba.com/firsts/dirk-firsts_050526.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2010) ("The first
international players ever drafted by the NBA were ... Mexico's Manuel Raga in the 10th round
and Italy's Dino Meneghin in the 11th round during the 15 round 1970 Draft.").
111. See, e.g., NHL.com, Hockey in Europe, http://www.nhl.com/futures/europe.htm (last
visited Feb. 6, 2010) (stating that in 1969, Finnish-born forward Tommi Salmelainen was the first
European-trained prospect to be drafted in the NHL draft).
112. NBA.com Lifting the Torch, supra note 110.
113. Jonathan Abrams, N.B.A. Looks Overseas for Draft Prospects, and Doesn't See Much,
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2009 at SP11.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Hoopedia,
San
Antonio
Spurs,
http://hoopedia.nba.com/index.php?title=SanAntonioSpurs (last visited Feb. 6, 2010); see also
Spurs 2009-10 Roster, http://www.nba.com/spurs/roster/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2010) (showing that
Manu Ginobili is from Argentina and Tony Parker is from France).
118. Hoopedia, San Antonio Spurs, supra note 117.
119. Hoopedia, Tim Duncan, http://hoopedia.nba.com/index.php?title=TimDuncan (last
visited Feb. 6, 2010).
120. See generally NBA Collective BargainingAgreement Ratified and Signed, NBA.COM,
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Beginning with the 2006 NBA draft, the minimum age requirement to enter
the draft increased from eighteen to nineteen years old. 121 "United States
players must be at least one year removed from high school [and nineteen]
years of age (by the end of that calendar year) before entering the draft.
International players must turn [nineteen] during the calendar year of that
draft." 122
Similarly, in the NHL, identical drafting rules apply to North
American and non-North American hockey prospects. 123 Through the
years, nearly all of the NHL players have come from Canada
(approximately fifty-five percent today), Europe (approximately twentyfour percent today), and the U.S. (approximately twenty-one percent
today). 124 Correspondingly, the NHL has held an annual global draft since
1963. 125 The rules have slightly changed since the advent of the NHL
draft, but "[b]eginning with the 1980 Entry Draft and continuing today, all
[eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-year-]old North American and non-North
American born players have been eligible to be drafted." 126
D. Federaland State Employment Laws ProhibitingNational Origin
Discrimination
If Harper is going to be successful in his legal challenge, he would
most likely need to state a case that MLB is acting in violation of a federal
or state employment discrimination law. 127 Also, he must establish that the
employment law is not preempted by national labor law that oversees and
encourages collectively bargained agreements. 128
On the federal level, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits employment discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex

July 30, 2005, http://www.nba.com/news/CBA_050730.html.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. NHL.com, NHL Draft History, http://www.nhl.com/futures/drafthistory.html (last
visited Feb. 6, 2010).
124. NHLNumbers.com,
Nationalities,
http://www.nhlnumbers.com/countries.php?season=0910 (last visited Feb. 6, 2010) (showing that
over the last three NHL seasons (2007-2008, 2008-2009, 2009-2010): fifty-two to fifty-five
percent of players were from Canada, twenty-four to twenty-six percent of players were from
Europe, and twenty-one to twenty-two percent of players were from the U.S.).
125. See NHL.com, NHL Draft History, supra note 123 (stating that in the first NHL draft
in 1963, "[a]ll amateur players, 17 years of age and older who were not already sponsored by an
NHL club, were eligible to be drafted").
126. Id.
127. See infra Part IV.A.
128. See infra Part IV.B.
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[and] national origin."' 29 "Title VII prohibits not only intentional
discrimination, but also practices that have the effect of discriminating
against individuals because of their race, color, national origin, religion, or
sex." 130 Title VII defines an "employer" as "a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees." 131 The
statute defines "industry affecting commerce" as "any activity, business, or
industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct
commerce or the free flow of commerce." 132
The broad wording of the "Unlawful Employment Practices" section
of the statute makes it evident that the legislators intended Title VII to
cover all types of employment discrimination:
(a) Employer Practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 133
In addition to prohibiting private employment discrimination, Title
VII also created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
to implement the statute. 134 "Since its creation in 1964, Congress has
gradually extended EEOC powers to include investigatory authority,
creating conciliation programs, filing lawsuits, and conducting voluntary
assistance programs." 135 An employee or potential employee is required to

129. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (2006)).
130. Federal Laws
Prohibiting Job Discrimination Questions
and Answers,
http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b).
132. Id. § 2000e-(h).
133. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
134. Teaching with Documents: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/civil-rights-act (last visited
Feb. 6, 2010); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4.
135. Teaching with Documents: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, supra note 134.
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file a charge with the EEOC before filing a private lawsuit in court.

136

"If

a charge is filed with EEOC and also is covered by state or local law,
EEOC 'dual files' the charge with the state or local [Fair Employment
Practices Agencies], but ordinarily retains the charge for handling." 137
According to the EEOC, "[n]ational origin discrimination means
treating someone less favorably because he or she comes from a particular
place." 138 "It is illegal to discriminate against an individual because of
birthplace, ancestry, culture, or linguistic characteristics common to a
specific ethnic group."' 139
Prohibited national origin discriminatory
practices that may apply to Harper's case include recruitment,
compensation, or assignment of an employee. 140
Most states have enacted their own fair employment practices laws in
addition to Title VII. 141 "They often resemble Title VII, but sometimes
they sweep in smaller employers, cover a larger variety of minorities, or in
other respects have broader coverage. Title VII expressly permits the states
to enact such laws so long as they do not conflict." 142 Here, Harper would
likely bring his case in New York, as MLB's headquarters are located in
New York City. 143 In New York, the state employment discrimination
laws mirror the federal laws passed in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 144
In 1945, nineteen years before Congress passed the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, New York became the first state in the U.S. to enact a Human
Rights Law. 145 "This law prohibit[ed] discrimination in employment,
housing, credit, places of public accommodations, and non-sectarian
educational institutions, based on age, race, national origin, gender, sexual
orientation, marital status, disability, military status, and other specified
classes." 146 As stated below, section 296 of New York's Human Rights
136. Filing
a
Charge
of
Employment
Discrimination,
http://archive.eeoc.gov/charge/overview-charge-filing.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
137. Id.
138. National Origin Discrimination, http://archive.eeoc.gov/origin/index.html (last visited
Feb. 6, 2010).
139. Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination Questions and Answers, supra note 130.
140. See id. (listing the discriminatory practices prohibited under Title VII and other federal
employment discrimination laws).
141. 1 LEx K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 1.02[1] (2ded. 2009).
142. Id.
143. See
MLB.com:
Official
Info,
http://mlb.mlb com/mlb/officialinfo/aboutmlb/index.jsp (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
144. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (Supp. 2009); Cf 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
145. Museum
of
Disability
History
Disability
History
Week,
http://www.museumofdisability.org/disabilityhistoryweek.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
146. New
York
State
Division
of Human
Rights,
Mission
Statement,
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Law prohibits employment discrimination and contains language that is
very similar to the wording in Title VII:
1. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
(a) For an employer or licensing agency, because of the age,
race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military
status, sex, disability, predisposing genetic characteristics, or
marital status of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to
bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to
discriminate against such individual in compensation or in
terms, conditions or privileges of employment. 147
Regardless of whether a court uses New York state law or federal
law, Harper must prove that MLB unfairly discriminates against
prospective employees based on the national origin of the class of
players. 148 In MLB's current entry system, players born in the U.S.,
Canada, and Puerto Rico are treated differently-and worse-than players
born in all other countries. 149 As analyzed below, after examining the legal
history of cases involving "reverse" national origin discrimination, Harper
has a strong likelihood of prevailing in his potential case against MLB. 150
III. LEGAL HISTORY
A. "Reverse" National OriginDiscrimination
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted-and the EEOC was
created-to ensure that all workers have equal employment
opportunities. 151 The objective of Title VII was "to prevent arbitrary
employment discrimination." 152 These objectives "cannot be accomplished
if employers are allowed to discriminate against employees on the basis of
immutable characteristics or factors over which individuals have no

http://www.dhr.state.ny.us/mission.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
147. N.Y. ExEC. LAW § 296.
148. See infra Part IV.A.
149. See DRAFr RULES, supra note 4, at 4 (stating that a player is eligible for selection in
the First-Year Player Draft if he is a resident of the U.S., Canada, Puerto Rico or other U.S.
territory); see also infra Part [V.A.
150. See infra Part IV.A-B.
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); see also Thomas v. Rohner-Gehrig & Co., 582 F. Supp.
669, 675 (N.D. Ill. 1984); see also Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination Questions and
Answers, supra note 130.

152. Thomas, 582 F. Supp. at 675.
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control, such as country of birth." 53
' Consistent with this line of thinking,
"reverse" national origin discrimination is also prohibited. 154 In Thomas v.
Rohner-Gehrig & Co., the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois held that the plaintiffs' complaint alleging that they "were
discharged solely because they were born in the United States" was
"sufficient to state a Title VII cause of action based on national origin
discrimination." 155 The court reasoned that "employment discrimination
against American citizens based merely on country of birth, whether that
birthplace is the United States or elsewhere, contradicts the purpose and
intent of Title VII, as well as notions of fairness and equality." 156
It is important to note that the U.S. Supreme Court draws a distinction
between discrimination based on national origin, which is prohibited in
Title VII, and discrimination based on citizenship or alienage, which is not
prohibited. 151 In 1973, the Court in Espinoza v. FarahManufacturing Co.
stated that "[t]he term 'national origin' on its face refers to the country
where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from which his or
her ancestors came." 158 The Court explained:
Congress has assumed that the ban on national-origin
discrimination in § 701(b) [of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964] did not affect the historical practice of requiring
citizenship as a condition of employment. And there is no
reason to believe Congress intended the term "national origin"
in § 703 [of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] to have
any broader scope. 159
Based on this ruling in Espinoza, courts reject claims of "reverse"
discrimination when the claim involves discrimination on the basis of
American citizenship. 160
This is justified by the theory that "if
discrimination in favor of American citizens is not covered [under Title
VII], the same must of course be true in reverse." 161 However, in cases
involving a claim of national origin discrimination, courts have consistently
addressed the claim based on the merits of the case.162
153. Id. (citing Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980)).
154. See generally id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 95 (1973).
158. Id. at 88.
159. Id. at 91.
160. 3 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 141 § 59.03.

161. Id.
162. Id.
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Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a "reverse" racism case in
a similar manner to how it would potentially rule in a "reverse" national
origin case. 163 In 2009, the Court in Ricci v. DeStefano reversed a Second
Circuit ruling and held in favor of white and Hispanic firefighters from
New Haven, Connecticut. 164 "In 2003, 118 New Haven firefighters took
examinations to qualify for promotion to the rank of lieutenant or
captain." 165
When results of the examination "showed that white
candidates had outperformed minority candidates ...[s]ome firefighters
argued the tests should be discarded because the results showed the tests to
be discriminatory." 166 The City of New Haven agreed with the minority
firefighters who protested the results and threatened to sue had the
examinations counted. Subsequently, the examinations were voided, and
some "white and Hispanic firefighters who likely would have been
promoted based on their good test performance sued the City and some of
its officials." 167 On Title VHI grounds, the Court ruled against the City of
New Haven. 168 The Court held that "race-based action like the City's in
this case is impermissible under Title VII unless the employer can
demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not taken the action, it
would have been liable under the disparate-impact statute." 169 The Court
concluded that the City could not meet the disparate-impact threshold
standard, and "as a result, the City's action in discarding the tests was a
violation of Title VII." 170
As stated by the Court in Ricci, "Title VII prohibits both intentional
discrimination (known as 'disparate treatment') as well as, in some cases,
practices that are not intended to discriminate but in fact have a
disproportionately adverse effect on minorities (known as 'disparate
impact')." 171 Disparate-treatment cases are 'the most easily understood
type of discrimination' ... and occur where an employer has 'treated [a]
particular person less favorably than others because of a protected
trait." 172 In order to be successful, a plaintiff alleging disparate-treatment
discrimination "must establish 'that the defendant had a discriminatory
163. See Ricci v. DeStefano, Nos. 07-1428 and 08-328, slip op. at 2 (U.S. June 29, 2009),
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08pdf/07-1428.pdf.
164. See id. at 2, 34.

165. Id. at 1.
166. Id. at2.

167. Id.
168. Id. at 2-3.
169. Ricci, Nos. 07-1428 and 08-328, slip op. at 2.

170. Id. at 2-3.
171. Id. at 17.
172. Id. (citations omitted).
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intent or motive' for taking a job-related action." 173
In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green established a four-part formula for a plaintiff to use when making a
prima facie case for disparate-treatment employment discrimination. 174
The petitioner alleging a Title VII complaint "must carry the initial burden
under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial
discrimination." 175
The Court said that this may be done if the
complainant is able to show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and
the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications. 176
Although the McDonnell Douglas case involved an African-American
employee, the Court's formula also applies to national origin
discrimination. 177 The use of the term "minority" in the McDonnell
Douglas formula "does not imply that whites are excluded from the
protection of Title VII or from the application of this formula." 178 In
addition, while the formula, on its face, deals with refusal to hire, it has
been held to apply to other acts such as refusal to promote or discharge. 179
It is noteworthy that at the complaint stage, the McDonnell Douglas
formula does not require the plaintiff to show that the employer intended to
discriminate. 18o This omission "is dictated by the Court's determination to
keep the standards non-subjective and even mechanical." 181 While direct
evidence of a discriminatory motive behind an employment decision is
very helpful to a plaintiffs case, such evidence is rare and hard to come
by. 182 The Court in McDonnell Douglas recognized that in most instances
the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, and, accordingly, the
formula does not require proof of direct evidence of discriminatory intent

173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 18 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988)).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

Id.
Id.

177. 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 141 § 8.01[1] n.3.

178. Id.

179. Id. § 8.01[1].
180. Id.

181. Id.
182. Id.
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when making the prima facie showing. 183
Similarly, twenty years after creating the McDonnell Douglas
formula, the U.S. Supreme Court held that in a Title VII case, "a plaintiff
need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that 'race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice."' 184 Although
the Court made this ruling in Desert Palace,Inc. v. Costa, a "mixed-motive
case, i.e., where both legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated the
decision," the Court said "[t]he reason for treating circumstantial and direct
evidence alike is both clear and deep-rooted: "Circumstantial evidence is
not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive
than direct evidence." 185
According to the McDonnell Douglas formula, if the plaintiff satisfies
the burden and establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, then the
burden shifts to the employer "to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." 186 If the employer
is able to satisfy this burden, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
prove "that the reason given by the employer was not legitimate and
nondiscriminatory, but was 'pretextual,' that is, a sham to cover the real
discriminatory motivation." 187
Unlike disparate-treatment discrimination, which was specifically
outlawed in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the statute did not expressly
'
prohibit "policies or practices that produce a disparate impact." 188
However, twenty-seven years later, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, 189 which "included a provision codifying the prohibition on
disparate-impact discrimination." 190 The Ricci court interpreted the 1991
codification as follows:
Under the disparate-impact statute, a plaintiff establishes a
prima facie violation by showing that an employer uses "a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42
183. 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 141 § 8.01[1].
184. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(m)).
185. Id. at 100 (quotations omitted).
186. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
187. 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 141 § 8.01[1].
188. Ricci v. DeStefano, Nos. 07-1428 and 08-328, slip op. at 2 (U.S. June 29, 2009),
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08pdf/07-1428.pdf.
189. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006)).
190. Ricci, Nos. 07-1428 and 08-328, slip op. at 18.
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U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). An employer may defend against
liability by demonstrating that the practice is "job-related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity."
Ibid. Even if the employer meets that burden, however, a
plaintiff may still succeed by showing that the employer refuses
to adopt an available alternative employment practice that has
less disparate impact and serves the employer's legitimate
needs. 191
While the Ricci case involved discriminatory actions by a public employer,
private employers are also subject to the disparate-treatment and disparateimpact statutory prohibitions. 192
B. The Tension Between CollectiveBargainingAgreements Governed by
National Labor Law and Employment DiscriminationClaims Under
Federal and State Laws
In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) 193 "to protect the rights of employees and employers, to
encourage collective bargaining, and to curtail certain private sector labor
and management practices, which can harm the general welfare of workers,
businesses and the U.S. economy." 194 The NLRA was passed under the
guise of the Wagner Act, which was the first federal law that formally
recognized and legalized the important process of collective bargaining. 195
Section 8(a) of the NLRA states: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 .. .. 196

Section 157

addresses the rights of employees:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
191. Id.
at 18-19.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (governing the .actions of employers in general, without
differentiating between private and public employers).
193. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-69 (2006)).
Relations
Act,
Board,
National
Labor
194. National
Labor
Relations
http://www.nlrb.gov/about-us/overview/national-laborrelations.act.aspx (last visited Feb. 6,
2010).
195. 1 LEx K. LARSON, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01[1] (2009).

196. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
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the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) ....197
Correspondingly, section 158(a)(3) prohibits an employer from engaging in
"discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization." 198
When the NLRA was enacted in 1935, Congress had not yet passed
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.199 Interestingly, although several
federal appeals circuits in the late 1960s and early 1970s 200 ruled "that
racially discriminatory practices by an employer constituted unfair labor
practices under [s]ection 8 of the [NLRA].... [L]ater developments in the
law significantly limited the availability of the [NLRA] as a tool for
eliminating invidious discrimination by an employer on account of race or
national origin.,, 20 1
Today, section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA prohibits
employment discrimination "only if the discrimination is unjustified and
interferes with the affected employees' rights to act concertedly for their
own betterment." 20 2 By contrast, Title VII is much broader because it
prohibits such discrimination "without reference to its effect on the
employees' right to unite." 20 3 As a result, a claimant can bring both NLRA
and Title VII claims, or can elect to bring only one claim.204
This distinction between the statutes is illustrated by the 1981 holding
in Walker v. Harrison Radiator Division. 205 In Walker, an AfricanAmerican employee of Harrison Radiator Division-and member of the
Local 686 union-alleged that her employer and her union discriminated
against her because of her race. 206 The District Court from the Western

197. Id. § 157.
198. Id. § 158(a)(3).
199. National Labor Relations Board, National Labor Relations Act, supra note 195 (stating
that the NLRA was enacted in 1935, twenty-nine years before the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
passed).
200. See, e.g., United Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 416
F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir.

1971).
201. 4 LEX K. LARSON, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 114.02[ 11]
(2009).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See e.g., Walker v. Harrison Radiator Div., 27 FEP Cases 1437 (W.D.N.Y. 1981)
(stating that the employee brought Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims against the employer).
205. Id.
206. See generally id.
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District of New York stated that a claim need not be dismissed for failing
to exhaust the contractual and intra-union remedies inherent in the
collective bargaining agreement. 2 o7 The court held that "[a]rbitral and
contractual remedies are complementary to and separate from rights
guaranteed under the civil rights laws. 208 Accordingly, "[i]t has been
repeatedly held that exhaustion of contractual and/or intra-union remedies
is not a prerequisite to bringing suit under Title VII." 209
This holding is reinforced by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruling in Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. 210 In 1971, the court
compared the two discrimination statutes:
Although these two acts are not totally dissimilar, their
differences significantly overshadow their similarities. Absent a
special consideration, a determination arising solely under one
statute should not automatically be binding when a similar
question arises under another statute ....
Hence certain
discriminatory practices that are valid under the [NLRA] may be
invalid under Title VII. 211
Collectively, these holdings exhibit that a claimant can successfully
challenge an employer's discriminatory practices under Title VII, even
where the employee works in a collectively bargained environment agreed
to by management in conjunction with the employee's union. 212
Twelve years after the NLRA was passed, Congress enacted the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), which effectively amended the
NLRA. 213 "Although the LMRA did not change the stated basic policy of
the [NLRA], it recognized that the free flow of commerce might also be
impeded by the actions of employees and labor organizations, as well as
those of employers. 2 14 As a result, the LMRA gave protection to
employers by prohibiting certain conduct of unions and employees and by
declaring specified conduct of employers and unions as unlawful. 215
If Harper attempts to establish a state-law claim of national origin
discrimination against MLB, then the evolving meaning of section 301 of

207. Id. at 1438.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971).
211. Id. at 128-29 (citation omitted).
212. See, e.g., Walker, 27 FEP Cases 1437; Tipler, 443 F.2d 125.
213. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat.
136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (2006)).
214. 1 LEx K. LARSON, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 [2] (2009).
215. Id.
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the LMRA could be vital to his case.216 Section 301(a) addresses the
jurisdictional aspect of suits by and against labor organizations:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor
organization, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties. 217
In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck applied
section 301(a) broadly, stating that "Congress has mandated that federal
law govern the meaning given [labor] contract terms. Since the state tort
purports to give life to these terms in a different environment, it is preempted." 218 Furthermore, the Court held "that when resolution of a statelaw claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an
agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must
either be treated as a section 301 claim, or dismissed as pre-empted by
federal labor-contract law.", 2 19 However, the Court was emphatic in
stating: "Clearly, section 301 does not grant the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement the ability to contract for what is illegal under state
law." 220
Three years later, the U.S. Supreme Court in Lingle v. Norge Division
of Magic Chef Inc. clarified and limited the impact that section 301 has on
preemption of state tort claims. 221 The Court cited a 1962 decision in
Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America v.
Lucas Flour Co., which held that "in enacting section 301 Congress
intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over
inconsistent local rules." 222 The 1962 ruling further stressed how different
meanings of contract terms under state and federal law could have a
disruptive influence on the bargaining and application of collective
agreements:
The ordering and adjusting of competing interests through a
process of free and voluntary collective bargaining is the
216. See infra Part II.B.
217. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
218. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1985).
219. Id. at 220 (citation omitted).
220. Id. at 212.
221. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
222. Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962).
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keystone of the federal scheme to promote industrial peace.
State law which frustrates the effort of Congress to stimulate the
smooth functioning of that process thus strikes at the very core
of federal labor policy. 223
In Lingle, the Court used this reasoning to establish that section 301
preempts a state-law claim "only if such application requires the
interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement." 224 As a result, federal
courts would preempt state-law national origin claims where the CBA
specifically prohibits discrimination based on national origin. 225 "Thus the
state-law claim would hinge on the interpretation of the collective
However, where the state-law claim arises
bargaining agreement.
independent of the provisions of the CBA, the courts will allow it." 226
Recently, in two suits against large organizations, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals used a two-step approach to analyze section 301
22
preemption. 27 In September 2009, the court in Williams v. National
Football League affirmed a district court ruling that two Minnesota
Vikings football players in the National Football League (NFL) had valid
state law claims after being suspended by the league for failing a banned
substance test. 228 The court held that both Minnesota's Drug and Alcohol
Testing in the Workplace Act-which prohibits Minnesota employers from
disciplining or discharging a first-time offender 2 29-and Minnesota's
Consumable Products Act230 were not preempted by an NFL rule that a
first-time offender of the league's banned substance policy would
automatically receive an unpaid, four-game suspension.231 The Eighth
Circuit applied a two-part test to determine whether the state-law claims
were sufficiently independent from the rule in the NFL CBA to avoid being
preempted by section 301:
First, a state-law claim is preempted if it is based on a provision
of the CBA, meaning that the CBA provision at issue actually
sets forth the right upon which the claim is based.
Second, section 301 preemption applies where a state-law claim

223. Id.
224. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413.
225. 4 LEX K. LARSON, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 114.02[3][b] (2009).
226. Id.
227. See generally Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009); see
also Bogan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 500 F.3d 828 (8th Cir. 2007).
228. Williams, 582 F.3d at 868, 870.
229. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.950-181.957 (West 2006).
230. Id. § 181.938.
231. Williams, 582 F.3d at 868-69.
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is dependent upon an analysis of the relevant CBA, meaning that
the plaintiffs state-law claim requires interpretation of a
provision of the CBA. 232
The court concluded that the state-law claims were not preempted because
"[t]he NFL does not point to a specific provision of either the CBA or the
Policy which must be interpreted." 233However, the Williams judgment is
not final, as the NFL is considering appealing the Eighth Circuit ruling to
the U.S. Supreme Court. 234 Also, in November 2009, NFL Commissioner
Roger Goodell took the unusual step of testifying in front of the Energy and
Commerce Committee in an attempt to have Congress "change federal
labor laws to prevent states from interfering with the league's efforts to
enforce its banned substances policy. ' 23 5 If the Williams verdict is
affirmed, the ramifications could be monumental, as the verdict may
preclude the NFL and other professional sports leagues from implementing
a drug-testing policy if any part of it contradicts any state law. 236 Peter
Ginsberg, an attorney for the two Vikings players, responded to the Eighth
Circuit decision, saying, "[i]t's a terrific ruling for us and it's a terrific
ruling for unionized employees everywhere.... [E]ven an $8 billion
business cannot ignore liberty rights and protections established by state
legislatures." 237 Similarly, after the ruling in Williams, "Scott Boras, an
agent for many of the top players in baseball, said an adherence to state
workplace laws would reshape the collective bargaining process .... 'The
parties will now have to consider the limitation of employment
rights ....
238
The two-step approach that was implemented in Williams was also
used two years earlier by the Eighth Circuit in Bogan v. General Motors
Corp. 239 In Bogan, a former employee filed a state-law claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress after General Motors fired
232. Id. at 874 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
233. Id. at 877.
234. Steve Karnowski, Appeals Court Declines to Rehear Williamses Case, WASH.
EXAMINER, Dec. 14, 2009, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/sports/Appeals-court-declinesto-rehear-Williamses-case-79248932.html
235. Ken Belson, NFL. Seeks Help in Enforcing Its Drug Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2009, at B 15.
236. See Michael S. Schmidt, In Blow to Antidoping Efforts, Athletes Gain Leeway in Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2009, at Al ("A federal court ruling has jeopardized the National Football
League's ability to enforce its drug-testing program and raised significant doubts about the
programs of other professional sports in the United States.").
237. Amy Forliti, Appeals Court: Vikings DTs Can Play, ABC NEWS, Sept. 11, 2009,
http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/wireStory?id=8547868.
238. Schmidt, supra note 237.
239. Bogan v. Gen. Motors Corp, 500 F.3d 828, 832 (8th Cir. 2007).
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her. 240 The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling, holding that
the woman's claim was not preempted by section 301. 24 In the first step
of its section 301 analysis, the court held that the state-law claim was not
based on the CBA provision that gave General Motors the "right to hire;
promote; discharge or discipline for cause; and to maintain discipline and
efficiency of employees." 2 42 In the second part of the test, the court ruled
that the state-law claim was not "inextricably intertwined with
consideration of the terms of the labor contract [because] a jury will not
have to concern itself with [General Motors'] right to hire, promote,
discharge, or discipline in order to resolve the alleged emotional distress
claim." 243 In addition, the court expressed its belief that a narrow approach
to LMRA preemption, "which asks only whether the claim itself is
necessarily grounded in rights established by a CBA, is more faithful to
[Supreme Court precedent]" than a broader approach which considers an
employer's relevant defenses. 244
IV.

ANALYSIS

A. Harper'sValid "Reverse" National OriginDiscriminationClaim
Against Major League Baseball
When applying federal and state national origin discrimination laws
to Harper's case, it is evident that Harper and all draft-eligible U.S.
baseball players (as well as Canadians and Puerto Ricans) could
successfully state a claim of "reverse" national origin discrimination
inherent in the drafting system. 245 "A professional sports organization's
relationship with its players and potential players is, at base, an employer's
relationship with its employees and, like other employer-employee
relationships, is regulated under state and federal law." 246 As a result, the
league and its thirty baseball teams must comply with the provisions of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as state laws prohibiting

240. Id. at 829.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 832.
243. Id. at 833.
244. Id.
245. See supra Part III.A.
246. N. Jeremi Duru, Fielding a Team for the Fans: The Societal Consequences and Title
VII Implications of Race-Considered Roster Construction in Professional Sport, 84 WASH. U.
L.R. 375, 376-77 (2006).
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employment discrimination based on national origin. 247 All employers
with at least fifteen employees are regulated by Title VII, 248 and "the law
offers no distinction between the half-billion-dollar sports franchise to
which millions of fans are devoted and the modest, fifteen-employee,
convenience store of which only a few hundred patrons are aware. Both
organizations must comply with Title VII." 249
As stated above, "reverse" national origin discrimination against
people born in the U.S. is strictly prohibited under Title VII and many state
discrimination laws, and this unfair labor practice has been occurring in
baseball since the inception of the draft in 1965.250 Title VII explicitly
states that an employer is not allowed to discriminate against any individual
with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment. ,25 Harper's recruitment into MLB is undeniably being
affected here, as well as his privileges of employment. 252 Harper can only
enter MLB through the draft, 253 while an international player can sign with
any team of his choosing for any negotiated amount once he reaches the
age of seventeen
(and possibly sixteen depending on the player's
25 4
birthday).
Furthermore, compensation is not equal for players drafted in the
draft and foreign-born baseball players who are able to sign with any
baseball team for any amount.255 In 2002, MLB established salary
guidelines for each draft slot that teams are strongly encouraged to
follow. 256
Although clubs are not bound to observe the slotting
suggestions made by the commissioner's office, that may not be the case
much longer. 257 When the current CBA expires in 201 1, some baseball
experts expect that MLB will be successful in establishing a mandatory
signing system for draftees. 258 MLB may adopt a slotting system similar to
247. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
248. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b).
249. Duru, supra note 247, at 377.
250. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); see generally Rausch, supra note 52.
251. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
252. See generally id. § 2000e-2(a).
253. See supra Part I.
254. See supra Part I; see also Segura, supra note 19.
255. See, e.g., supra note 16.
256. David Waldstein, N.B.A. Could Be Model for New Baseball Draft, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
19, 2009, at B10.
257. See id.
258. Id. ("[E]xperts say they believe baseball will succeed in implementing the NBA model
during the next round of negotiations, particularly because many veteran players tend to have
little or no solidarity with unproven players, and could direct the union to give in on that issue in
favor of something else.").
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the one instituted in the NBA, where each draft pick slot is assigned a
salary figure, and a corresponding rookie contract cannot be more than
twenty percent below or above that figure. 25 9 MLB could also follow the
NFL's lead and institute a rookie salary pool in which each team has the
choice of how to divide up money to draft picks, as long as the annual
spending does not exceed the allotted total. 260
While Rob Manfred, MLB's executive vice president for labor
relations, believes that adding a draft salary scale will be important in
future CBA negotiations, he disagrees with the notion that the current
system is being ignored. 261 Manfred cites these statistics for the 2009 draft
class: sixty-five percent of the draft picks signed at or below MLB's
recommended figure, and seventy-six percent of rookie contracts fell
within five percent of the slotting suggestions.262 However, further
research shows that in the same 2009 draft "all [thirty] teams went over the
recommended slot amount, which was lowered by [ten] percent across the
board [compared to the previous year], with at least one signee." 2 63
On the other hand, there is no maximum amount that international
players are allowed to sign for, and historically, elite foreign free agents
have signed for more money than U.S. players selected at the top of the
draft. 264 This system has received much criticism, and before the 2009
draft there were rumors that Scott Boras, the agent for Stephen Strasburg,
the eventual number one overall pick, was looking to establish foreign
265
residency for the San Diego State pitcher in order to obtain free agency.
Boras has been an outspoken opponent of the current drafting system as he
believes that it suppresses the incomes of U.S. players to "[twenty] cents on
the dollar." 266 However, as discussed above, establishing foreign residency
would not garner free agency for a baseball player who has already
enrolled in a high school or a college in the U.S. 267
Boras is no stranger to exploiting draft loopholes. In 1996, four
draftees who did not receive contract offers within fifteen days of being
selected were granted free agency; and in 1997, Boras advised J.D. Drew to
sign with an independent professional team instead of signing with the
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Waldstein, supra note 257.
Id.
See, e.g., supra note 16.
Sheinin, supra note 23.
Id.
See supra Part I.
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team that drafted him. 268 "That year, the draft was still called the
'amateur' draft, and its eligibility rules applied only to players who had
never signed a contract with a major or minor league team." 269 Boras
believed that Drew would play for an independent minor league team for a
year and would then become a free agent a week before the next year's
draft. 27 0 However, before the 1998 draft, "MLB revised the rule, renaming
the draft the 'first-year player draft' and stating that independent league
players were still subject to the draft. 271 As a result, Boras' free agency
plan backfired, and Drew re-entered the draft in 1998, where he was
selected by the St. Louis Cardinals. 272
As illustrated above, entry into the draft is not beneficial to U.S.
players, as it restricts their options and potentially limits their
compensation. 273 By not allowing U.S. amateur baseball players to sign
with major league teams as free agents, these prospects are being
discriminated against by MLB. 274 Courts have consistently held that
disparate treatment is found when "an employer has 'treated [a] particular
person less favorably than others because of a protected trait." 275 This is
precisely the case for Harper and other U.S. prospects because the current
baseball drafting system results in less favorable treatment on the face of
the MLB rules.2 76 Furthermore, this disparate treatment is based on
national origin, a trait explicitly targeted by the authors of Title VII. 277
While it may be difficult for Harper to find direct evidence to
"establish 'that the [league] had a discriminatory intent or motive' for
taking a job-related action," 278 the McDonnell Douglas formula does not
require proof of direct evidence of discriminatory intent at the prima facie
stage. 279 As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Desert Palace, "a
plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to

268. Sheinin, supra note 23.

269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See supraPart I.
274. See supra Part IV.A.
275. Ricci v. DeStefano, Nos. 07-1428 and 08-328, slip op. at 17 (U.S. June 29, 2009),
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08pdf/07-1428.pdf (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985-86 (1988)).
276. See DRAFT RULES, supra note 4, at 4.
277. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
278. Ricci, Nos. 07-1428 and 08-328, slip op. at 18.
279. 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 141 § 8.01 [1].
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conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that... 'national origin was
a motivating factor for any employment practice."' 280 Using circumstantial
evidence, Harper has a strong likelihood of satisfying the McDonnell
Douglas factors because he is a U.S. player who is as qualified as a nonU.S. player and yet is treated differently only because of where he was
born. 28 1 The burden would then shift to MLB "to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." 282 It
does not appear that there are any legitimate reasons for the disparity of
draft rules. If there were valid reasons, then Commissioner Bud Selig and
baseball management would not be publicly supportive of a global draft. 283
Using the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning from Ricci, MLB's
"reverse" national origin discrimination against U.S. players would be
considered "impermissible under Title VII unless the employer can
it
demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not taken the action,284
statute."
disparate-impact
the
under
liable
would have been
Employment practices that have a disproportionately adverse effect on
minorities, even though there is no intent to discriminate, are prohibited
under disparate-impact discrimination. 285 Here, there is no valid argument
that foreign players would be able to bring a claim of disparate-impact
discrimination because they are the class that is benefiting from not being
eligible for the MLB draft. 286
Puerto Rican baseball players are a prime example of the negative
effects of being included in the draft pool. 287 Before becoming eligible for
the draft, baseball in Puerto Rico was flourishing. 288 Since 1989, when
MLB began including Puerto Ricans in the draft, there has been a stark
280. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003).
281. See 1 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 141 § 8.01 [1].
282. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
283. See Blum,supra note 101.
284. Ricci v. DeStefano, Nos. 07-1428 and 08-328, slip op. at 2 (U.S. June 29, 2009),
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08pdf/07-1428.pdf
285. Id. at 17 ("Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] prohibits both intentional
discrimination (known as 'disparate treatment') as well as, in some cases, practices that are not
intended to discriminate but in fact have a disproportionately adverse effect on minorities (known
as 'disparate impact').").
286. See supra Part IV.A (illustrating that U.S. players are treated less favorably than nonU.S. players because of the drafting requirement in MLB).
287. See generally Sanchez, supra note 68 (stating that "in 1989, 47 players were signed,
compared to only 21 in 2003"); see also Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 62, at 20 ("In less than
a decade after 1989, the number of Puerto Rican players signed per year had dropped more than
40%.").
288. See Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 62, at 20 ("The large majority of MLB players
born in the U.S. territories are from Puerto Rico.... The percentages of players from U.S.
territories increased until 1993, and then began decreasing.").
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decline in Puerto Rican players in the major leagues, 289 and baseball in
Puerto Rico has also been suffering. 290
In addition to disparate-treatment discrimination, U.S. players such as
Harper could also state a claim for disparate-impact discrimination. 29' As
stated in Ricci, "a plaintiff establishes a prima facie violation by showing
that an employer uses a 'particular employment practice that causes a
disparate impact on the basis of. .. national origin. ' ' ' 292 Even if an
employer is able to prove that the practice at issue is job-related and
consistent with business necessity, a plaintiff may prevail by showing that
there is an "available alternative employment practice that has a less
disparate impact and serves the employer's legitimate needs." 293 Statistics
detailing the declining percentage of U.S. major leaguers since the advent
of the draft in 1965, coupled with the tremendous rise in the percentage of
international players in the MLB today, 294 should sufficiently exhibit the
disparate impact on U.S. players. Also, evidence confirming Scott Boras'
"[twenty] cents on the dollar" 295 contention would effectively prove that
U.S. players are significantly devalued as a result of this disparate impact.
Lastly, MLB would not be able to refute a disparate-impact claim
because the creation of a worldwide draft would undoubtedly be an
alternative employment practice that serves the employer's legitimate
needs and has less disparate impact on Harper and other U.S. players
compared to the current unfair labor practice instituted in MLB. 296
B. Section 301 Would Not PreemptHarper'sFederalor State Employment
DiscriminationClaim
If Harper is able to state a successful claim of national origin
discrimination under Title VII or a similar state law, he would still have to
overcome potential preemption by section 301 of the LMRA. 297 Current
289. See supra note 288.
290. Sanchez, supra note 68 ("Last month, the Puerto Rico Winter league announced it was
suspending play after 69 years because of financial problems.").
291. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, Nos. 07-1428 and 08-328, slip op. at 18 (U.S. June 29,
2009), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08pdf/07-1428.pdf (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k)(l)(A)(i)).
292. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i)).
293. Id. at 18-19.
294. Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 62, at 29.
295. Sheinin, supra note 23.
296. See Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 62, at 29 ("A worldwide draft would slow the
increase in the numbers of foreign players; no longer would foreign players enjoy the advantage
that the draft now creates.").
297. See supra Part IlI.B.
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and future players are governed by the rules established in baseball's CBA,
and the LMRA (and NLRA) encourages the formation of collective
bargaining agreements. 298 However, as illustrated above in the Walker and
Tipler decisions, a claimant can successfully challenge an employer's
discriminatory practices under Title VII, even when the employee is
governed by rules that were collectively bargained. 299 The reasoning
behind this principle is that section 301 is aimed at preventing inconsistent
state laws from effectively nullifying the terms agreed upon during the
collective bargaining process. 300 Consequently, section 301 only applies to
state-law claims, not federal claims, and Harper's potential Title VII claim
would not be preempted. 301
On the other hand, if Harper brings a state-law employment
discrimination claim against MLB, a federal court would have to analyze
whether the state-law claim is preempted by section 301.302 If the statelaw claim hinges on the court's interpretation of the CBA, the claim would
be preempted by section 301.303 But if the state-law claim exists
independent of the terms agreed upon in the CBA, it would not be
preempted by national labor law. 304
When applying the two-part test that the Eighth Circuit recently
implemented in Williams and Bogan, it is likely that neither part of the
preemption test is satisfied in Harper's case. 305 In Article XV (titled
"Miscellaneous") of the 2007-2011 MLB CBA, section (A) contains a "No
Discrimination" clause which states that:
The Clubs will not interfere with, restrain or coerce Players
because of membership in or lawful activity on behalf of the
Association, nor will they discriminate because of Association
activity in regard to hire, tenure or employment or any term or
condition of employment.
The provisions of this Agreement shall be applied to all Players
298. See National Labor Relations Board, National Labor Relations Act, supra note 195.
299. See supra Part III.B.
300. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209-10 (1985).
301. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988) (stating that
section 301 only preempts a state-law claim "if such application requires the interpretation of a
collective bargaining agreement").
302. See supra Part III.B.
303. See generally Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 874 (8th Cir. 2009);
see also Bogan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 500 F.3d 828, 832 (8th Cir. 2007).
304. 4 LEX K. LARSON, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 114.02[31[b] (2009).
305. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 874 ("First, a 'state-law claim is preempted if it is "based

on" [a] ... provision of the CBA[,]' meaning that '[t]he CBA provision at issue' actually sets
forth the right upon which the claim is based."); see also Bogan, 500 F.3d at 832.
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covered by this Agreement without regard to race, color,
religion or national origin. 306
In dissecting the wording of the first part of this clause, major league teams
cannot discriminate against a player based on the player's membership in
the MLBPA. 30 7 The second part of the "No Discrimination" section
specifies that the CBA applies to all players equally, irrespective of any
discriminatory characterization. 308 However, if a MLB rule inherently
applies differently to players from varying countries of national origin,
there does not appear to be a right of action in the CBA upon which a
national origin claim would be based. 309 As a result, a state-law claim
would not be preempted. 310
The second part of the two-step approach states that "section 301
preemption applies where a state-law claim is dependent upon an analysis
of the relevant CBA, meaning that the plaintiff's state-law claim requires
interpretation of a provision of the CBA." 31 1 Similar to the analysis above,
because the CBA does not address a current or prospective player's right to
bring a discrimination claim, there is no interpretation of the CBA that
needs to be done by a court. 3 12 When applying a narrow approach to
section 301 preemption-as favored by the Eighth Circuit in Bogan-the
state-law claim would not be preempted because "[a] jury would not have
to concern itself with" MLB's "No Discrimination" policy in order to
resolve Harper's claim. 3 13 In echoing the proclamation made by the
winning lawyer in Williams: "[E]ven [a billion-dollar] business cannot
ignore liberty rights and protections established by state legislatures." 314
V. CONCLUSION
If Bryce Harper is successful in fighting for his equal rights while
blazing a trail towards free agency, his valuable contribution to the sport of
306. 2007-2011 CBA, supra note 14, at 48.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See generally id.
310. 4 LEX K. LARSON, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 114.02[3][b] (2009) (stating that
a state-law claim that exists independent of the terms agreed upon in the CBA would not be
preempted by national labor law).
311. Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 874 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bogan
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 500 F.3d 828, 832 (8th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotations omitted).
312. See id. (stating that "section 301 preemption applies where a state-law claim is
dependent upon an analysis of the relevant CBA, meaning that the plaintiffs state-law claim
requires interpretation of a provision of the CBA" (internal citations omitted)).
313. Bogan, 500 F.3d at 833.
314. Forliti, supra note 238.
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baseball would be everlasting on a global scale. As exhibited in the
analysis above, Harper's chances of winning a "reverse" national origin
discrimination case would be more likely than not. 315 Harper and all other
U.S. baseball prospects are being treated unfairly solely based on where
they were born. 316 The trend of baseball teams spending more and more
money cultivating prospects in Latin American countries is only
growing, 3 17 and the time is ripe for a player in Harper's position to
challenge baseball's drafting system. If Harper had been born in any
country besides the U.S., Canada or Puerto Rico, teams would enter a
bidding war to obtain his potentially invaluable services. 318 He would be
able to negotiate a rookie contract for as much money as the highest suitor
would be willing to pay him, and more importantly, he would have the
choice as to what city he would live in and what baseball uniform he would
put on during at least his first six seasons in the major leagues. "19
While it is noteworthy that Harper is being advised by Scott Boras, 320
who has a well-established reputation as baseball's most famous loopholeseeking agent, 321 it is not known whether Boras will push Harper towards
free agency by filing a lawsuit against MLB for "reverse" national origin
However, if Harper were to win an employment
discrimination.
discrimination lawsuit against MLB, it is possible that the league and the
MLBPA would re-open the CBA and implement a worldwide draft. 322
Both sides have tentatively agreed to an international draft in the past, 323
and losing a lawsuit would likely give the parties the impetus to open up
the draft pool to all players from all countries with uniform eligibility rules.
It is unfortunate that there have been forty-five years of baseball entry
drafts in which U.S. amateurs have been treated worse than foreign players,
but the past cannot be changed, and only baseball's future can be altered.
If Harper is not the player to change baseball, then maybe some other

315. See supra Part IV.
316. See supra Part IV.A.
317. See generally Baxter, supra note 81.
318. See, e.g., supranote 16.
319. See 2007-2011 CBA, supra note 14, at 70-71 ("[A]ny Player with 6 or more years of
Major League service who has not executed a contract for the next succeeding season shall be
eligible to become a free agent... [and] negotiate and contract with any Club without any
restrictions or qualifications .... ).
320. Verducci, supra note 1, at 64-65.
321. See supra Part IV.A.
322. Blum, supra note 101 (stating that re-opening the CBA is an option, but noting that a
MLB official in 2008 did not think that the owners would push for the MLBPA to re-open the
current CBA over the worldwide draft issue).
323. See 2003-2006 CBA, supra note 47, at 202.
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American (or Canadian or Puerto Rican) teenager will come along
someday soon and fight for fairness in the MLB draft. Of course, there
would be no need to resort to litigation if MLB and the MLBPA were to
finally come together and institute a global draft with equality for all.
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